Against alignment: the value of non-democratic science

Abstract The claim that science is value-laden raises concerns that reliance on science, both by individuals or policymakers, might be incompatible with respect for autonomy or democratic principles. This article explores one response to this problem, that, when appealing to non-epistemic values in scientific contexts, scientists ought to use the “democratic” values which their audiences would agree upon. Ultimately, it argues that this “Democratic Alignment Demand” should be rejected. Section 1 articulates why the “Democratic Alignment Demand” may seem appealing. Section 2 suggests a problem with the demand: that it seems implausible in the analogous case of artistic production. Section 3 draws on this analogy to argue that the demand is far weaker than it seems. Section 4 adds a further argument against the demand: that it confuses a sufficient condition for legitimacy with a necessary condition.