Conceptual Analysis in Meta‐Ethics: A Case Against Ethical Descriptivism

ABSTRACT Many contemporary moral and political philosophers assume that any satisfactory analysis of ethical terms should grasp their ordinary usage. As noted in the literature, this methodological premise implies that the analysis of ethical concepts is not concerned with the Platonic realm, but rather with making explicit what is covered by those terms in ordinary language. Call this view, “ethical descriptivism”. In this article, I make a case against this approach without relying on normative analysis, thereby avoiding engagement in disputes over fundamental methodological principles that appear intractable at first glance. I argue that ethical descriptivism is inherently flawed on its own terms. Specifically, it faces significant problems regarding the concept of rights, an indispensable ethical term in moral theory, political philosophy, and public discourse. On the one hand, if the friend of ethical descriptivism embraces the ordinary polyfunctional character of rights, her analysis becomes unhelpful in addressing standard questions about the directionality of duties. On the other hand, the friend of ethical descriptivism may attempt to conceptualise rights according to a single function. However, I show that this possibility fails due to methodological shortcomings.