Kant’s Idealized Imputation of the Propensity to Evil in Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason

In Religion, Kant posits an innate and natural propensity to evil, which he implicitly designates as “radical evil”. However, this notion has been criticized for its apparent incompatibility with freedom and its problematic atemporality, leading scholars to dismiss it as an obscure metaphysical speculation or an uncritical residue of Christian doctrine rather than a morally necessary element. Drawing on student notes from Kant’s lectures, I firstly contend that the apparent conflict between an innate–natural propensity to evil and human freedom can be resolved through Kant’s imputation theory and empirical psychology. While evil originates from this innate ground in human nature, it can ultimately be overcome through the exercise of free will. Secondly, my argument proceeds to show that radical evil first emerges in Religion, not as a concept of agnostic metaphysical abstraction, but as a necessary postulate for Kant’s idealized conscience-based imputation. This imputation transcends the constraints of temporality, thereby idealizing the propensity to evil into radical evil. Atemporality is merely an analogy representing this imputation’s independence from temporal constraints. Thirdly, although this idealized imputation and radical evil are absent from Kant’s pre- and post-Religion works, my analysis suggests that the idealized imputation is necessary for his project of advancing the individual and collective moral progress through the mediation of religion.