ANALYSIS OF THE INTERACTION BETWEEN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE FROM AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE

From an economic perspective, the coordination between law enforcement and executive agencies is a two-way interactive relationship, and the coordination and cooperation between them should be aimed at maximizing common interests. Based on the “Smart Pig Game” model, the use of incentives to facilitate the transfer of criminal cases by administrative agencies should be comprehensively considered. According to the “cost-benefit” approach to decision-making, public security agencies should bear the subjective burden of proving facts. From the point of view of the law of supply and demand, a corresponding reduction in the standard of proof for administrative bodies when transferring criminal cases can contribute to a closer connection between criminal justice. To solve the problem of information asymmetry in the interaction between law enforcement and executive bodies, the supervisory function of the prosecutor ’s office as a third party should be strengthened.