Fight Against Malicious Tracking Jammer: A Quantitative Compensation Based Collaborative Jamming-Deceiving Approach

This study proposes a quantitative compensation mechanism based on multi-user cooperative anti-jamming strategies in wireless communication system. The fundamental principle is to exploit the tracking characteristics of jammer by deploying decoy user to attract jamming attacks, thereby shielding the communication of legitimate users on other channels. Furthermore, a compensation mechanism of power price is designed to enhance the transmission satisfaction of the decoy user, with the associated power cost shared collectively by all users. The communication resources allocation under jamming conditions is first addressed and modeled as a consensus game with existence of a pure strategy Nash Equilibrium. Subsequently, the system performance is further improved by the proposed channel-power joint optimization algorithm based on the compensation mechanism. Simulation results demonstrate that the proposed algorithm can improve system utility effectively, while simultaneously satisfying the basic communication requirements of the decoy user.