Sextus Empiricus on Induction and Grammatical Rules

Abstract This paper explores Sextus Empiricus’ critique of induction, with a particular focus on his arguments against universal grammatical rules in Against the Grammarians (M1 221–227). Sextus challenges the grammarians’ reliance on induction to establish universal theorems, arguing that such rules cannot reliably be established from either exhaustive or partial examination of linguistic cases. By dismantling both perfect and imperfect induction, Sextus highlights the limitations of grammarians’ methodology and questions the very possibility of universal grammatical rules. The analysis also examines Sextus’ conclusion that linguistic correctness is determined by the common usage of the speaker’s community rather than by universal principles. This position intriguingly aligns with modern discussions of linguistic rule-following, particularly Kripke’s interpretation of Wittgenstein. Both Sextus and ‘Kripkenstein’ emphasize the contextual and communal basis of rule-following, rejecting the notion of objective, universal linguistic rules. The paper further considers whether Sextus’ critique is consistent with his broader skeptical methodology, which avoids dogmatic conclusions. While his arguments against induction may seem dogmatic at first glance, they ultimately aim to induce suspension of judgment and to undermine the dogmatism of grammarians. However, they involve disregarding both the inductive method and universal linguistic rules in ordinary life. The final section explores how an Alexandrian grammarian, such as Apollonius Dyscolus, might respond to Sextus’ critique. The grammarian’s most viable defense lies in conceding that grammar, like other empirical disciplines, is not exact and cannot achieve absolute universality. This means recognizing that Sextus’ criticism is partially on target.