Ideology, Red in Tooth and Claw: Realist Ideology Critique and Animals

Political realism and ideology critique have, as of late, sparked renewed interest within Anglophone political philosophy. Contemporary political philosophy, realists complain, has become excessively grounded in moral philosophy—a branch, some say, of applied ethics (Bernard Williams 2005; Geuss 2008; Rossi and Sleat 2014; Sleat 2018). The latter, in turn, contend that political philosophers should spend greater effort analyzing how ideologies legitimize and help sustain unjust social arrangements (Shelby 2003; Haslanger 2017; Lafont 2024; Celikates et al. 2025). Recently, a growing number of philosophers—realist ideology critics—have attempted to combine both views, claiming that while political philosophers should indeed be interested in ideology critique, they should, in doing so, eschew moral considerations, emphasizing instead ideologies' epistemic flaws—that is, drawing on epistemic, rather than on moral, normativity (Prinz and Rossi 2017; Rossi and Argenton 2021; Aytac and Rossi 2022; Clark 2024).1 The core of realist ideology critique is fairly straightforward. Powerful agents and institutions usually appeal to, and rely on, legitimation stories—ideologies, in a purely descriptive sense. These justifying ideologies might be transmitted and disseminated in different ways. For instance, because they have survived an ideal deliberative procedure, where all viewpoints are adequately represented, and participants abide by stringent epistemic norms. Or, quite often, by dint of the very power of those whose power is being justified in the first place—who, in highly hierarchical settings, are powerful enough to disseminate beliefs supporting the legitimacy of their own power and status, while simultaneously preventing others from effectively contesting such legitimation stories. In the latter kind of cases, which constitute the main focus of realist ideology critique, the relevant legitimating ideologies are viciously circular: justifications of power differentials, that is, become widespread precisely in virtue of those power differentials. Drawing on extensive historical, anthropological, and sociological evidence, Aytac and Rossi (2022) and Rossi and Argenton (2021) argue that such an account can explain folk intuitions about the legitimacy of private property, as well as the persistence of neopatriarchical social arrangements in the MENA region (Middle East and North Africa). Realist ideology critics argue that we have compelling reasons to be cautious about, distrust, or perhaps even abandon legitimation stories that are viciously circular, as they are epistemically unreliable. In other words, given how we acquired them, we should not expect those beliefs to reliably (i.e., non-accidentally) track the truth. Instead, we should expect them to track the motives and interests of those with the power to disseminate those beliefs without significant contestation. Realist ideology critique, as we will see, admits of radical and moderate declinations, but the above (stylized) characterization should suffice for now. Neither the new political realists—nor, more specifically, realist ideology critics—have given much thought to animals, however. This is surprising for a number of reasons. First, humans exert significant power over animals—whom we routinely kill for food and clothes; to test cosmetics, vaccines, and drugs; to advance scientific knowledge; or, quite often, in the name of tradition. These exercises of power, typically authorized or even actively supported by political institutions, rest to a large extent on legitimation stories involving the superiority and/or specialness of humans. Among those working within the “critical animal studies” tradition—alongside others working on ideology more generally (cf. Mills 2019)—it is common to treat these anthropocentric or speciesist systems of belief as ideologies (cf. Nibert 2002). Second, a growing body of social-scientific literature suggests that those stories are indeed epistemically suspect, being often the result of status quo bias, motivated reasoning, and other unreliable belief-formation processes. Third, and crucially, those legitimating stories can be easily disseminated because those with a stronger interest in challenging them (animals themselves) cannot, for obvious reasons, do so. At first glance, then, speciesist and anthropocentric social arrangements would appear to be every bit as viciously circular as those mentioned above, and thus ripe for the kind of analysis realist ideology critics favor. In this paper, I defend two main theses. First, I argue that realist ideology critique can be fruitfully used to condemn, on epistemic grounds, the exploitation of nonhuman animals—and, more generally, the social arrangements that underpin such exploitation. Second, I also contend that thinking about how to apply realist ideology critique to animals invites us (and suggests ways) to refine and expand the realist ideology critic's toolkit.2 The argument unfolds as follows. I begin, first, by reviewing a model of realist ideology critique developed, in a series of recent papers, by Enzo Rossi, Uğur Aytac, and Carlo Argenton. The Rossi–Aytac–Argenton model, as I shall call it, pinpoints two ways in which power asymmetries can render ideology formation and transmission mechanisms defective. Under conditions of strong social stratification, powerful agents are liable to motivated reasoning, which likely pervades their attempts to justify their own power. Such legitimation stories, moreover, can be easily transmitted since these agents can successfully obstruct significant, widespread, and coordinated contestation. The Rossi–Aytac–Argenton model, I argue, partially applies to speciesist and anthropocentrist social arrangements, insofar as those arrangements depend on legitimation stories that are (i) at least in many cases, traceable to motivated reasoning, and (ii) easy to disseminate, given the power asymmetries existing between humans and the other animals. There is an important difference, however, between the case of adult, able-minded humans—whose contestatory capacities are forcibly hindered by hierarchical social arrangements—and the case of nonhuman animals—who lack the relevant contestatory capacities to begin with, independently of how society is structured. The Rossi–Aytac–Argenton model, I suggest, can be fine-tuned to accommodate this distinction. In the last part of the paper, I argue, more tentatively, that even if some of our beliefs about animals' psychological capacities were not the result of social forces, but hardwired in our evolved psychology, realist ideology critics should nevertheless be concerned with them—a claim I defend by appealing to what I take to be realist ideology critique's main tenets and desiderata. Although this paper discusses a version of political realism, it does not merely address political realists. Others, too, have reason to care about the arguments presented here—especially those working in animal ethics. First, because there is a non-zero chance that political realism might be the correct all on animals on moral we the animal the of political realism might what I argue in this paper is however, that might not be the for the exploitation of animals would be on (i.e., Under conditions of it to all the as to Second, even if we that political do without appealing to moral considerations, we can (and that moral are and quite often liable to moral we can our if we appeal both to moral and Realist ideology critique animal to their it This paper is as follows. In I political realism and realist ideology critique, and a more characterization of the how the model can be fruitfully applied to at least some of our beliefs about the moral status and psychological capacities of animals to the argument on beliefs legitimating In I to an account of as by some in the to ways in which realist ideology can fruitfully mechanisms of ideology formation and Political realism is a by a with the in which many political philosophers are to rely on moral This is, of in different ways. 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The model, as we have how highly hierarchical social arrangements their own in epistemically ways. This model on beliefs that are and In this I will defend that epistemically unreliable even if not social in should also be of interest to realist ideology critics if these beliefs explain the of political institutions or the persistence of social arrangements, and the two the to the status quo and to do I will focus on the case of and speciesist in the humans are typically The of however, et al. et al. Recently, (2022) has that might be at least and a of is, the to over Although the of are many that it is at least hardwired our evolved psychology, a of in in which social et al. For the of this then, I shall that is least a of our evolved however, beliefs on the above to some are epistemically unreliable. First, to the extent that they are evolved beliefs that result from within we should not expect them to track moral truth. 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