Do expected utility maximizers have commitment issues?

Abstract Critics have argued that expected utility theory fails as a theory of rational choice for diachronic agents who expect their preferences to change in response to temptations. According to this criticism, such agents cannot rationally commit to executing a sequence of actions, even when doing so would produce outcomes they consistently prefer. Call this the Commitment Problem for expected utility theory. In this paper, I argue that the Commitment Problem is based on a mistake. I show that expected utility maximizers who care about their future will form and execute plans, even when they are nearly certain of facing preference reversals. In doing so, they learn that they can trust themselves, and that allows their future selves to rationally pursue outcomes that they prefer even today. By modeling an agent's successive selves as players in a Bayesian reputation game, I show that this holds in most everyday circumstances where a person expects to have at least a short future that they care about. In cases where it does not hold, they should intuitively not trust themselves. I conclude that there is no Commitment Problem for expected utility theory.