THE DEFENCE OF DURESS: INCONSISTENT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT RULINGS AND NATIONAL LAW GUIDANCE

Abstract This article explores how national law principles can address inconsistencies in the application of the defence of duress at the International Criminal Court (ICC). The Rome Statute is the first to codify this defence, but its application remains challenging. In Ongwen , both the Trial and Appeal Chambers rejected the defence due to a lack of imminent death or serious harm. Conversely, in Ag Mahmoud , Judge Antoine Kesia-Mbe Mindua found the defence applicable, criticising its narrow interpretation in Ongwen . A restrictive interpretation risks rendering the defence meaningless, while an overly broad one could undermine the ICC's goal of avoiding impunity. Ongwen and Ag Mahmoud are examined, highlighting inconsistencies in interpreting the defence of duress. Drawing on general principles from selected legal systems, the article proposes an approach to balance accountability for serious crimes with a meaningful use of this defence by the ICC.