Bartleby’s Non-Obligation of Wilful Will-lessness and the Concept of Freedom.

This paper critically reexamines the concept of freedom by analyzing the non-obligatory mode of existence embodied by Bartleby, the protagonist of Herman Melville’s Bartleby, the Scrivener. Bartleby’s non-obligation stems from a will that prefers not to act, that is, a will that wills nothing. His repeated phrase, “I would prefer not to,” signifies a withdrawal from ethical, institutional, and social relations and can be interpreted as a refusal of any obligatory action. This non-obligation ultimately leads to a reconsideration of Hegel’s normative concept of freedom, which is grounded in self-negation and mutual recognition. Bartleby does not complete the dialectical process through which identity is formed by self-determination. He practices a freedom based on self-erasure and non-relation, revealing the ethical dimension of Freigabe “letting-be”, which implies renouncing domination over both self and others. His stance reveals characteristics such as indifferentiality and indeterminacy, raising questions overlooked by existing theories of freedom and calling for a more refined and complex philosophical approach.