Was Friedrich August Hayek a Utilitarian?

Abstract This study critically revises narratives in the literature concerning the relationship between Friedrich August von Hayek’s philosophy and utilitarianism, aiming to organize and clarify the discourse in this field. At the heart of Hayek’s philosophical system lies the value of individual liberty, defined as the absence of coercion by others. Hayek presents it as a foundational and autonomous value – one that is essential to moral agency and the very essence of morality. He argues that the denial of individual liberty degrades the individual to a mere instrument for others’ ends, a stance he deems morally indefensible. Despite this, Hayek explores the consequences (across various dimensions) of adopting or rejecting freedom as a cornerstone of social order to engage those who might undervalue freedom. Such explorations have contributed to the common interpretation of his work as utilitarian – one important, though not exclusive, factor behind this attribution. However, examining his works reveals that this classification does not hold, as his approach does not fulfill the necessary conditions to count as utilitarianism (consequentialist reasoning featured in his philosophy is neither central nor aligns with utilitarian frameworks). Demonstrating that Hayek’s philosophy diverges from utilitarianism is essential for its accurate interpretation. Misattributing utilitarianism, and therefore collectivist thinking, to Hayek leads to inaccurate interpretations that undermine the individualistic and libertarian nature of his philosophy.