The complex effects of regime complexity: a conflict model

Regime complexity is often assumed to be either detrimental or conducive to global governance. We argue that the effects of complexity vary depending on why actors turn institutional overlaps into manifest conflicts over the prevalence of different norms and rules (so-called interface conflicts) and how these conflicts are managed. This paper conjectures that two types of interface conflicts shape the effects of complexity in distinct ways. First, non-instrumental interface conflicts are side-effects of institutional differentiation that emerge when new events or issues evoke incompatible response strategies by different institutions. Since none of the actors involved in such conflicts necessarily have an interest in undermining the other, they are likely to be handled in a cooperative way and thus have integrative effects for institutional order. Second, instrumental interface conflicts are purposeful creations of actors seeking political advantage by positioning one norm or rule against another. Here, overlaps are utilized to substantively contest existing institutions, making non-cooperative conflict management, and eventually the fragmentation of institutional order more likely. To analyze these conjectures, we first conduct cluster analyses of 77 interface conflicts which reveal “benign,” “malign,” and “hybrid” clusters of interface conflicts. We further analyze temporal and causal sequences in qualitative case studies for each cluster.