Lead Independent Directors: Is Membership on the Audit Committee Associated With the Presence of an Industry Specialist Auditor?

ABSTRACT This study investigates whether firms with a lead independent director who serves on the audit committee are more likely to have an industry specialist auditor. Based on prior research indicating that lead independent directors are associated with higher quality corporate governance and higher quality financial reporting, we hypothesize that lead independent directors who serve on the audit committee may advocate for high‐quality auditing, resulting in a greater likelihood that the firm will have an industry specialist. Consistent with this expectation and Agency Theory, our results suggest that firms with a lead independent director who serves on the audit committee are associated with either a 28.6% or a 16.8% increase in the likelihood of having an industry specialist auditor, depending on the measure of industry specialization used.

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Publication Details

Journal
International Journal of Auditing
Published
2025-09-19
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1111/ijau.70007
Primary Topic
Auditing, Earnings Management, Governance
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00
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article

Lead Independent Directors: Is Membership on the Audit Committee Associated With the Presence of an Industry Specialist Auditor?

David B. Bryan, Terry W. Mason, Ashley N. West
International Journal of Auditing
Auditing, Earnings Management, Governance
article

Lead Independent Directors: Is Membership on the Audit Committee Associated With the Presence of an Industry Specialist Auditor?

David B. Bryan, Terry W. Mason, Ashley N. West
article en

Abstract

ABSTRACT This study investigates whether firms with a lead independent director who serves on the audit committee are more likely to have an industry specialist auditor. Based on prior research indicating that lead independent directors are associated with higher quality corporate governance and higher quality financial reporting, we hypothesize that lead independent directors who serve on the audit committee may advocate for high‐quality auditing, resulting in a greater likelihood that the firm will have an industry specialist. Consistent with this expectation and Agency Theory, our results suggest that firms with a lead independent director who serves on the audit committee are associated with either a 28.6% or a 16.8% increase in the likelihood of having an industry specialist auditor, depending on the measure of industry specialization used.

International Journal of AuditingVol. 30(1)
University of North Florida (US), Kansas State University (US)
Openalex Percentile: Top 63%
Auditing, Earnings Management, Governance
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