Engagement without Resolution: How Downward Delegation Initiatives Could Undermine Everyday Contention Governance in China

Abstract The conventional literature suggests that the Chinese party-state has further strengthened social control and reinforced stability maintenance through expanded grassroots delegation. However, drawing on fieldwork interviews, government reports and media coverage, this article demonstrates that initiatives aimed at delegating power may actually weaken the government’s substantive responsiveness, thereby hindering the everyday management of disputes. The inherent tension of decentralization within a centralized political system leads to an uneven distribution of incentives and resources among agents at various levels. While more logistical powers (such as surveillance and mundane daily services) are allocated to grassroots governments, most decision-making and coercive powers (law enforcement and court rulings) remain in the hands of district-level functional departments. Grassroots officials are increasingly required to take broad responsibility for resolving citizen complaints, yet they face significant obstacles in mobilizing the relevant functional departments to address these issues. The reduced efficiency of problem-solving at the grassroots level not only increases the burden on grassroots bureaucrats to appease aggrieved citizens but also diminishes the effectiveness of initial efforts to contain routine grievances and prevent their escalation. This poses greater challenges for higher-level governments in balancing control and inclusivity, as well as in maintaining the legitimacy of state-sanctioned participatory institutions and the regime.