Research on the Co-Evolution Mechanism of Electricity Market Entities Enabled by Shared Energy Storage: A Tripartite Game Perspective Incorporating Dynamic Incentives/Penalties and Stochastic Disturbances

The integration of renewable energy into the grid has led to problems such as low utilization rate of energy storage resources (“underutilization after construction”) and insufficient system stability. This paper studied the co-evolution mechanism of power market entities empowered by shared energy storage. Based on the interaction among power generation enterprises, power grid operators, and government regulatory agencies, this paper constructed a three-party evolutionary game model. The model introduced a dynamic reward and punishment mechanism as well as a random interference mechanism, which makes it more in line with the actual situation. The stability conditions of the game players were analyzed by using stochastic differential equations, and the influences of key parameters and incentive mechanisms on the stability of the game players were investigated through numerical simulation. The main research results showed the following: (1) The benefits of shared energy storage and opportunistic gains had a significant impact on the strategic choices of power generation companies and grid operators. (2) The regulatory efficiency had significantly promoted the long-term stable maintenance of the system. (3) Dynamic incentives were superior to static incentives in promoting cooperation, while the deterrent effect of static penalties is stronger than that of dynamic penalties. (4) The increase in the intensity of random disturbances led to strategy oscillation. This study suggested that the government implement gradient-based dynamic incentives, maintain strict static penalties to curb opportunism, and enhance regulatory robustness against uncertainty. This research provided theoretical and practical inspirations for optimizing energy storage incentive policies and promoting multi-subject coordination in the power market.

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Publication Details

Journal
Systems
Published
2025-09-18
DOI
https://doi.org/10.3390/systems13090817
Citations
9
Primary Topic
Smart Grid Energy Management
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
6.57
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article

Research on the Co-Evolution Mechanism of Electricity Market Entities Enabled by Shared Energy Storage: A Tripartite Game Perspective Incorporating Dynamic Incentives/Penalties and Stochastic Disturbances

Xinping Wang, Chang Su, Boying Li, Zhen Xu
9 citations
Systems
Smart Grid Energy Management
6.57
article

Research on the Co-Evolution Mechanism of Electricity Market Entities Enabled by Shared Energy Storage: A Tripartite Game Perspective Incorporating Dynamic Incentives/Penalties and Stochastic Disturbances

Xinping Wang, Chang Su, Boying Li, Zhen Xu
article en
9 citations

Abstract

The integration of renewable energy into the grid has led to problems such as low utilization rate of energy storage resources (“underutilization after construction”) and insufficient system stability. This paper studied the co-evolution mechanism of power market entities empowered by shared energy storage. Based on the interaction among power generation enterprises, power grid operators, and government regulatory agencies, this paper constructed a three-party evolutionary game model. The model introduced a dynamic reward and punishment mechanism as well as a random interference mechanism, which makes it more in line with the actual situation. The stability conditions of the game players were analyzed by using stochastic differential equations, and the influences of key parameters and incentive mechanisms on the stability of the game players were investigated through numerical simulation. The main research results showed the following: (1) The benefits of shared energy storage and opportunistic gains had a significant impact on the strategic choices of power generation companies and grid operators. (2) The regulatory efficiency had significantly promoted the long-term stable maintenance of the system. (3) Dynamic incentives were superior to static incentives in promoting cooperation, while the deterrent effect of static penalties is stronger than that of dynamic penalties. (4) The increase in the intensity of random disturbances led to strategy oscillation. This study suggested that the government implement gradient-based dynamic incentives, maintain strict static penalties to curb opportunism, and enhance regulatory robustness against uncertainty. This research provided theoretical and practical inspirations for optimizing energy storage incentive policies and promoting multi-subject coordination in the power market.

SystemsVol. 13(9)
Xi'an University of Science and Technology (CN), Tongji University (CN)
Openalex Percentile: Top 3%
Smart Grid Energy Management
6.57
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