Nash bargaining is implementable via two-stage rights structures
Koray and Yildiz (2018) introduces a new framework for implementation in which the main tool to design is the rights structure introduced by Sertel (2001).It was assumed that there is only one stage to obtain the equilibrium outcome of a rights structure.We formulate implementation via two-stage rights structures and show that the Nash bargaining solution is implementable via two-stage rights structures.
Authors
- Kemal Yıldız (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4352-3197)
Institutions
- Bilkent University (TR)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Published
- 2025-09-18
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107214
- Citations
- 1
- Primary Topic
- Game Theory and Voting Systems
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 3.13