Epistemic Hopelessness and Other Vices of Oppression

Abstract José Medina famously argues that privileged groups are prone to epistemic vices, while belonging to an oppressed group often is accompanied by epistemic virtue. In this paper, I will nuance this picture by arguing that members of marginalized groups are also disposed to develop many of the same epistemic vices as everybody else, and also that there are specific, character-forming features of oppression that may dispose one to a specific kind of epistemic vice I call “epistemic hopelessness.” In light of this, I show that Medina’s argument about the distribution of epistemic vice and virtue based on oppression and marginalization only holds if we describe the epistemic virtues that members of marginalized groups are disposed to as reliably made available through collective group efforts. Thus, this paper nuances our understanding of the epistemic obstacles that prevent us from accessing knowledge of oppression, even for those with direct experience of oppression, without being epistemically defeatist about our capacity to access knowledge about injustices.