On the Doctrine of Elements and the Demands of Kantian Virtue

Abstract In the Doctrine of Virtue , Kant develops an elaborate virtue ethics grounded in two ends that are also duties: our own perfection and the happiness of others. Kant says apparently inconsistent things about the nature of these duties, however, leaving ambiguous precisely what the demands of Kantian virtue are. In the Doctrine of Virtue , Kant says that duties of virtue govern only our freedom to set ends, not our freedom of action; that such duties are not coercively enforceable; and that there are only two of them. Yet in the Doctrine of Elements , Kant seems to contradict all these commitments by positing numerous additional duties of virtue, at least some of which (such as duties against suicide or excessive drinking) look to be coercively enforceable constraints on actions. In this paper I develop a cohesive account of Kant’s virtue ethics that reconciles these apparent contradictions. We should take Kant at his word, I argue, when he says that there are only two duties of virtue and that those duties exclusively constrain our internal freedom to set ends. Adopting the ends of virtue, however, involves cultivating a continuous and principled commitment to our own perfection and the happiness of others. The duties Kant describes in the Doctrine of Elements are intended to illustrate which subsidiary commitments follow from a genuine commitment to the two ends required by virtue. They are not normatively independent duties, however, nor (contrary to appearances) are they coercively enforceable constraints on action.