Wie lautet die formale Rechtspflicht zur Wahrhaftigkeit in <b> <i>Über ein vermeintes Recht aus Menschenliebe zu lügen</i> </b>?

Abstract On a Supposed Right to Lie from Philanthropy concerns truthfulness as a formal duty of right. But how, precisely, does Kant formulate this duty? My essay offers the first systematic examination of this question. I show that it is neither a duty to truthfulness in statements generally (contra Geismann), nor a duty to truthfulness in declarations (contra Wood), but rather a duty to truthfulness in necessary statements in general, as all competing interpretations lead to contradictions with Kant’s conception of truthfulness as a formal duty of right. As I argue, the single explicit formulation Kant himself employs serves as the foundation of his thought on this subject. This interpretation – perhaps the first to rest on a truly Kantian basis – nevertheless draws significantly on key insights from the long tradition of textual exegesis.