Reason, Thinking, <i>Geist</i>: Epistemological Concepts in Frege’s Philosophy

Abstract I analyze three crucial epistemological concepts that appear in isolated passages throughout Frege’s work. First, I argue that the concept of reason should be understood as the faculty which gives sense to objectivity – that is, it makes knowledge possible. Second, after distinguishing thinking from psychological representations, I show how thinking enables the correlation between the spirit ( Geist ), which I conceive as an ego, and thoughts, which are ontologically independent and objective, but, from an epistemological standpoint, necessarily related to the ego. Third, I examine Frege’s peculiar notion of ‘being given’ and claim that the givenness of thoughts to the ego amounts to giving meaning to objectivity through thinking, for without this, we would be unable even to understand what objectivity is. I conclude that Frege’s fragmentary reflections on these issues can be better comprehended through a transcendental perspective that explains how knowledge functions as a whole, rather than being restricted to logic alone.