Wartime Developments in the Nigerian-Biafran War: An Assessment of Diplomatic Policies And Peace Initiatives, 1967-1970

Diplomacy has long served as a primary means of conflict resolution, both before the outbreak of war and during wartime. When Diplomacy fails to sustain peace, war becomes the last resort. In wartime, however, diplomacy often shifts focus toward ceasefires and sustainable peace. This dynamic was evident in Nigeria-Biafra relations: the failure of pre-war peace summits led to open conflict, after which diplomatic efforts intensified in pursuit of a ceasefire. Employing a chronological narrative approach, this paper examines peace summits held before and during the Nigerian-Biafran War, the positions of the belligerents, and the role of international actors. It also analyzes why the peace conferences failed, using Zero-Sum Game Theory as an interpretive framework. The study draws its sources mainly from archival materials, textbooks, journals, magazines, and newspapers. Findings reveal the enormous human and material costs of the conflict and demonstrate that the peace summits failed mainly due to the absence of a neutral mediator, the asymmetric nature of the war, and the unwillingness of the parties to compromise. The paper recommends adopting neutral mediation, confidence-building measures, and inclusive negotiation frameworks to prevent similar outcomes in future conflicts. This study contributes to the growing body of knowledge on peacebuilding and conflict management in African societies. Keywords: War, Diplomacy, Nigeria, Biafran, Ceasefire.