Kant’s Empowering Conception of Hybrid agency ^*

On Kant’s view, human agents are ‘animals endowed with reason,’ sensitive to both natural and moral incentives. His model is hybrid rather than dualistic: insofar as humans are sensitive to the authority of rational norms, they can transform themselves from animal rationabile into animal rationale. This raises the question: how do hybrid agents navigate the heterogeneity of incentives? This is a live question, giving rise to a methodological puzzle. What methodology fits hybrid agency? Two opposing approaches, reductive naturalism and anti-naturalism, have prevailed, with John McDowell offering a non reductive variety of naturalism based on second nature. In contrast, this essay argues that Kant’s view vindicates the positive aspects of naturalism and anti-naturalism, while rejecting the reductive ambitions of the former and the robust ontology of the latter. Hybrid rational agency, characterized by self-reflection, allows for rational changes that are not merely adaptive responses but radical, original acts of reorientation toward the world. By refocusing on Kant’s account of moral agency, we recover the resources for a distinctive critique of reductive naturalism, showing its conservative and alienating effects. Kant provides an empowering view of human agency, in dialectical contrast to the second nature model based on habit and social training.