Tenurial Arrangements and Agricultural Efficiency: Empirical Evidence from Jammu and Kashmir, India

This study investigates the comparative efficiency of farmers in the Jammu region of Jammu and Kashmir, focusing on three categories of cultivators: owner-operators, fixed renters, and sharecroppers. Farm-level data consisting of 144 farmers analyzed through efficiency measurement techniques namely Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) reveal that owner-operators exhibit significantly higher levels of both technical and cost efficiency compared to tenant farmers. Among the tenancy systems, fixed renters outperform sharecroppers, indicating that the latter are comparatively less efficient. These results provide empirical confirmation of the Marshallian inefficiency hypothesis, which posits that sharecropping leads to lower efficiency due to disincentives for optimal input use. The findings suggest that enhancing tenure security and promoting efficient tenancy arrangements could improve productivity in the region. Policy interventions should therefore focus on reforming tenancy laws, facilitating access to credit, and incentivizing transitions toward more secure and efficient cultivation systems.