Robustness Analysis of PID‐Integrated AGC Under Various False Data Injection Attacks in Smart Grid

ABSTRACT In this work, the vulnerability of a proportional–integral–derivative (PID) controller‐based automatic generation control (AGC) system to four different false data injection (FDI) attacks is investigated and the complications involved in maintaining nominal frequency during load changes are addressed. Scaling, pulse, ramp, and random attack models are employed as FDI attacks in an event‐triggered scenario to illustrate a broad spectrum of potential real‐world situations that could interfere with AGC operations in the context of smart grids. Also, the robustness of a previously established controlled switching unit (CSU) developed for the PID‐based AGC to defend against a long‐term scaling‐based FDI attack is examined under diverse stealthy short‐term FDI attack scenarios. Experimental results indicate the overall severity of the scaling attacks for a conventional AGC system. Also, the effectiveness of the CSU in mitigating the impacts of complex FDI attacks on the PID parameters is demonstrated by an in‐depth examination of its performance, which signifies the normal operation of a PID‐based system irrespective of attack scenarios.