Diagnosing intuition: a phenomenological account of intuitive knowledge in clinical practice

This paper inquires into the nature of clinical intuition through the lens of phenomenology. Although intuition plays a significant role in diagnosis, its nature remains controversial, frequently portrayed as vague, irrational, or unreliable. Drawing on the phenomenological philosophies of Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger, I shall argue that intuition is not a mere emotive response but a structured and interpretive form of knowledge. After reviewing clinical literature and introducing Dreyfus's model of skill acquisition, the paper examines Husserl's <i>categorial intuition</i> and Heidegger's <i>hermeneutical intuition</i>. These two notions challenge the dichotomy between intuition and rationality by revealing the multifactorial nature of experience. Finally, the paper applies these insights to the phenomenon of praecox feeling in schizophrenia diagnosis, demonstrating how phenomenology can illuminate the complex structure of intuitive experience in diagnostic procedures.