Evolutionary Game Analysis of Stakeholder Strategies in China’s Basic Education under the “Double Reduction” Policy

The reduction of excessive academic burden in China's basic education system has been established as a central objective of national education reform and has become a subject of intense policy debate.To elucidate the complex strategic interactions that shape the implementation of the "Double Reduction" policy, a multi-agent evolutionary game model was constructed incorporating three principal stakeholder groups: government authorities, schools and teachers, and students and parents.Replicator dynamic equations were employed to examine the evolutionary stability of stakeholder strategies and the conditions under which equilibrium outcomes emerge.Through numerical simulations, the influence of regulatory enforcement intensity on behavioral trajectories and convergence patterns was evaluated.The results reveal that asymptotically stable equilibria exist, with optimal system performance achieved when government bodies maintain active and credible regulatory oversight, educational institutions engage in substantive and sustained burden-reduction efforts, and families adopt cooperative and adaptive responses.By clarifying the mechanisms through which stakeholder interactions determine collective outcomes, this study provides theoretical support for the refinement of policy coordination and the long-term enhancement of education governance capacity.These findings contribute not only to the understanding of the "Double Reduction" policy's systemic impact but also to broader discussions on the role of evolutionary game theory in evaluating multi-agent policy interventions in education systems.