Cultural evolution in the laboratory: evolution of cooperative altruistic punishing

Culture consists of practices - behaviour patterns - shared by members of a group. Some attempts to demonstrate evolution of cultural practices in the laboratory have shown evolution of material products, such as paper aeroplanes. Some attempts have shown evolution of actual group behaviour. The present experiments demonstrated evolution of group coordination across generations in punishing defection in a public-goods game. Cost of punishing defection varied across replicates that consisted of series of groups (generations) of 10 undergraduates each. Each generation played the game anonymously for 10 rounds and could write messages to the other participants and punish defection every round. The effectiveness of punishment depended on the number of participants choosing to punish. In Experiment 1, cultural transmission from generation to generation consisted of written advice from one generation read aloud to the next generation. In Experiment 2, transmission from generation to generation consisted of having some participants return from the previous group. The cost of punishing varied across replicates: zero, one, two or five cents. In both experiments, the evolution of altruistic punishing was strongly dependent on the cost of punishing. The results add to plausibility of studying evolution of complex behaviour patterns like cooperation in the laboratory.

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Publication Details

Journal
Evolutionary Human Sciences
Published
2025-01-01
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1017/ehs.2025.10018
Primary Topic
Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
Type
article
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article

Cultural evolution in the laboratory: evolution of cooperative altruistic punishing

Peter J. Richerson, William M. Baum
Evolutionary Human Sciences
Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
article

Cultural evolution in the laboratory: evolution of cooperative altruistic punishing

Peter J. Richerson, William M. Baum
article en

Abstract

Culture consists of practices - behaviour patterns - shared by members of a group. Some attempts to demonstrate evolution of cultural practices in the laboratory have shown evolution of material products, such as paper aeroplanes. Some attempts have shown evolution of actual group behaviour. The present experiments demonstrated evolution of group coordination across generations in punishing defection in a public-goods game. Cost of punishing defection varied across replicates that consisted of series of groups (generations) of 10 undergraduates each. Each generation played the game anonymously for 10 rounds and could write messages to the other participants and punish defection every round. The effectiveness of punishment depended on the number of participants choosing to punish. In Experiment 1, cultural transmission from generation to generation consisted of written advice from one generation read aloud to the next generation. In Experiment 2, transmission from generation to generation consisted of having some participants return from the previous group. The cost of punishing varied across replicates: zero, one, two or five cents. In both experiments, the evolution of altruistic punishing was strongly dependent on the cost of punishing. The results add to plausibility of studying evolution of complex behaviour patterns like cooperation in the laboratory.

Evolutionary Human SciencesVol. 7
University of California System (US), University of California, Davis (US)
Openalex Percentile: Top 67%
Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
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Cultural evolution in the laboratory: evolution of cooperative altruistic punishing — Peter J. Richerson, William M. Baum · Evolutionary Human Sciences (2025) | TGRS Research Map | TGRS