Why Blame? On Justification of Practices of Holding Morally Responsible

The normative question that is discussed in modern studies of moral responsibility rather often is the question of reasons that would make holding someone responsible inappropriate. But what is discussed far less frequently is the logically prior question of what what reasons, if any, do we have in favor of the practice of holding each other morally responsible at all — that is, what reasons can we offer to justify blaming or praising someone, especially given that actions and attitudes connected to the negative side of holding one morally responsible (blame), are harmful for those they are directed at, while harming an agent is ceteris paribus wrong? I hold that not just any kind of reason will do to justify practices of blaming broadly similar to ours, but only some kinds of reasons would be appropriate to use to this end. In this paper I try to point out some general features that such reasons should have. Firstly, unsurprisingly, it should be practical and not epistemic reasons we use for such a justification. Secondly, it should be moral reasons: other kinds of practical reasons will not do. Thirdly, it should be moral reasons of relatively low generality, i.e. the reasons like pointing out that the practice of blaming will make the things go best or could not be reasonably rejected do not seem appropriate. Fourthly, these reasons should be morally decisive in a sense that they should not produce more moral problems that they solve. Having discussed these features I go on to point out several kinds of reasons that, I believe, are appropriate to be used in justification of our blaming practices and do in fact go a long way to provide a satisfactory justification of them: reasons of right for protection, reasons of solidarity and too-much-to-ask reasons. Finally, I discuss what my conclusions mean for justification of our actual blaming practices, and not just the ones that are broadly similar to them.