What Do We Need for Blame

The paper is devoted to the conceptual analysis of the phenomenon of moral responsibility. A preliminary classification of the types of responsibility is given and it is indicated what is meant by moral responsibility in the framework of this research. This is a responsibility that arises within interpersonal relationships within the framework of modern secular culture. Then there are two approaches to the study of this phenomenon: broad and narrow. Within the framework of a broad approach, we are interested in the fundamental nature of moral responsibility. Within the framework of a narrow approach, we are interested in nuancing our ideas about the details of the practice of imposing responsibility and increasing our moral sensitivity. Further discussion is conducted within the framework of a broad approach. An analysis of the act of holding someone responsible is proposed: it consists of a moral agent, a moral factor, a moral value and a moral evaluation. Then there are two main intuitions that are associated with correctly holding someone responsible: the intuition of control and the intuition of character. The intuition of control indicates that the person we hold responsible should have been in control of what we hold him responsible for. The intuition of the character says that the moral character of this person is also important to us. The intuition of control gives us three conditions for the correct imposition of moral responsibility: the control condition, the epistemic condition, and the personal identity condition. I am putting the personal identity condition out of brackets. The intuition of character gives us the normative condition for the correct imposition of responsibility. Then the definition of the reduction of one condition to another is formulated. It is argued that the epistemic condition is reducible to both the control condition and the normative condition; the control condition is not reducible to either the epistemic condition or the normative condition; the normative condition is not reducible to either the control condition or the epistemic condition. In conclusion, the thesis about the dual nature of moral responsibility is formulated.