On the Human Ability to Meet Moral Requirements

The article compares the theories of moral obligations and defines the ways of their critical evaluation. Several grounds are proposed for distinguishing between theories of moral obligations. (1) Theories of moral obligations react differently to the fact that there is a discrepancy between the requirement imposed by a moral obligation on an agent and the agent’s ability to fulfill this requirement. (2) Theories that are sensitive to this fact can be divided depending on how they interpret the coordination between moral obligation and agent’s ability. (3) The problem of understanding the boundary between unfulfillable and feasible obligations is related to the problem of interpreting the concept of a moral agent. Theories of moral obligations differ in what kind of moral psychology they presuppose (first, whether the moral agent is simple or complex), and then how the “decisive reasons” are understood in the case of actions to fulfill a moral obligation. If it is important for theory that a moral agent be a rational agent, then theories differ in understanding what role moral obligations play in the process of practical deliberation and how this process works. In the light of the proposed ways to evaluate theories of moral obligations, the following theories are critically examined: (1) Natural law theories, in their theistic and non-theistic versions; (2) Voluntarist theories, in their two main versions: the Divine command theory and the Social command theory; (3) The “Kantian theory” by Christine Korsgaard, the main thesis of which is that obligation is a means of preserving human identity. (4) An improved version of the Social command theory proposed by S. Darwell. In the context of the discussion of the fourth theory, the issue of the conceptual connection between the notions of moral obligation and moral blame is considered. In the light of R. Jay Wallace’s theory, some clarifications of Darwell’s theses are proposed.