The Carter Administration and the Turkish Political Crisis, 1977–1978: An Analysis of U.S. Foreign Policy Responses

The contemporary volatility in U.S.–Turkish relations underscores the need to revisit their historical underpinnings. The Turkish domestic crisis of 1977–1980 unfolded against the backdrop of deteriorating bilateral relations with Washington and was embedded within a wider spectrum of global instability. This conjunction of events prompted U.S. National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski to articulate the notion of an “Arc of Crisis” spanning the Eastern Mediterranean and the broader Middle East. This article examines the evolution of U.S. perceptions of the Turkish political crisis during the initial phase of the Carter administration (1977–1978), with particular attention to the intersection of domestic turmoil in Turkey and American strategic calculations in the region. The analysis draws on a diverse set of primary sources, including declassified documents from the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) series, internal State Department cables, National Security Council memoranda, and Central Intelligence Agency assessments. The findings suggest that, up until the declaration of martial law in December 1978, the Carter administration treated the Turkish crisis not as a self-contained domestic development but as a component of broader programmatic foreign policy goals. These included the stabilization of NATO’s southeastern flank and the management of geopolitical realignment following détente. However, Washington's delayed recognition of the severity of the Turkish crisis, coupled with a lack of coherent policy engagement, contributed to missed opportunities for early mitigation. From a longer-term perspective, the article argues that the Carter administration’s hesitant and inconsistent approach helped entrench a pattern of mistrust in Ankara toward U.S. policy, laying the foundations for structural tensions that continue to shape U.S.–Turkish relations in the post-Cold War era.