Patent rewards and the recognition of women’s inventive performance and potential

Abstract This study investigates the allocation of patent rewards to inventors, distinguishing between two types of reward structures: one-time bonuses, which are predominantly “backward-looking” and reward inventors for the predicted value of past inventions, and permanent rewards, such as baseline salary increases and promotions, which are more “forward-looking” in that they rely on past inventive performance to evaluate an inventor’s future contribution to the employer. We discuss possible reasons why women and men may receive different patent rewards, including the noisiness of past performance signals and the lens through which they are interpreted. Using unique survey data on 10,292 inventors in 22 countries, our analysis shows that female and male inventors are equally likely to receive one-time bonuses for seemingly equivalent inventions. However, women are less likely than men to receive permanent rewards. We discuss the implications of our findings for the retention and management of human capital in innovation and for gender equality in the workplace.