A decentred study of uncollaborative governance

Purpose This paper aims to examine the challenges of achieving collaborative governance in public decision-making, particularly in contexts where multiple, conflicting interests are present. It explores the governance dilemmas faced by public leaders who must navigate these tensions while aspiring to collaborative ideals. Design/methodology/approach Adopting a decentred perspective, the study draws on three qualitative case studies within the English healthcare system. It investigates how policy leaders facilitated structured opportunities for collaboration and how these were influenced by competing traditions and interests. Findings Despite efforts to enable collaboration, the case studies revealed that decision-making was often shaped by dominant policy leaders, impression management and persistent conflict. The analysis identifies three forms of “uncollaborative governance”: auditable uncollaboration, where formal procedures are used to create an appearance of collaboration while marginalising dissenting views; authoritative uncollaboration, where public leaders control information and agenda-setting to dominate decision-making; adversarial uncollaboration, where competition and critique between stakeholders are actively encouraged. These modes can coexist or evolve throughout policy cycles as leaders attempt to fulfil the symbolic or practical expectations of collaboration. Originality/value The paper contributes a novel typology of uncollaborative governance, challenging assumptions about the feasibility and desirability of collaboration in complex policy environments. It offers a nuanced account of how collaboration is shaped, constrained and sometimes subverted by competing institutional logics and strategic behaviour.