A TERCEIRA ANTINOMIA DA CRÍTICA DA RAZÃO PURA: O PRIMADO DO INTERESSE PRÁTICO DA RAZÃO NA QUESTÃO COSMOLÓGICA DA LIBERDADE

In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant focuses much of his discussion on the problem of freedom in the section devoted to the Third Antinomy. It is clear that the results achieved there provide the basis for subsequent Kantian research on the issue of freedom in the writings on moral philosophy. However, in the antinomies section, Kant is ostensibly concerned with a conflict between cosmological ideas, which seems unrelated to the problem of free will. If so, would the cosmological dimension of the problem of freedom have any relevance to the critical foundation of practical philosophy? Our aim is to analyze the importance of the cosmological dimension of the problem of freedom and how it is linked to the practical use of reason. For this, we try to show the links that the Critique establishes between the concepts of transcendental freedom (cosmological) and practical freedom (psychological) in each point of the argument of the Third Antinomy. There are, however, some difficulties with this strategy. First, Kant's argumentative movement in the exposition of the Third Antinomy is not clear, which seems, without further ado, to pass from the cosmological field to the psychological field through a link between cosmological freedom and psychological freedom. Second, how can Kant maintain that transcendental freedom, in resolving the Third Antinomy, can be the foundation of practical freedom. Our hypothesis, given these difficulties, is that there is a primacy of the practical interest of reason in the cosmological question of freedom, which justifies the links between the concepts of freedom and expresses the importance of the cosmological dimension for morality.