SOBRE A APLICAÇÃO DOS MODOS DE APRESENTAÇÃO NA EPISTEMOLOGIA DO KNOW-HOW: UMA DEFESA

With the publication of Knowing How, Stanley and Williamson revived the debate around practical knowledge. Essential to the intelectualist project is the application of practical modes of presentation (PMPs) in the framework. The goal of this article is to argue in defense of such application. For that, we are briefly introducing, in the first section, the role PMPs play in intelectualist epistemology. Soon after, we will appeal to the neofregean literature that, after Evans, defines regular modes relationally. The idea is to understand what modes tradionally are. With that in hand, we will present Glick's criticism towards PMPs. Shortly, for Glick, it is not possible to define PMPs in the same way as bona fideI modes. We'll aim to show how Glick's argument undermines canonical applications of the notion of sense. The solution to correctly define PMPs is to appeal to more theory. In the fourth section, we'll present Pavese's practial senses model and one of its instances, namely, motor commands. At last, we conclude in defense of the intelectualist application.