Does the Optimal Update Strategy Effectively Promote the Low-Carbon Technology Diffusion Among Manufacturers? An Evolutionary Game of Small-World Network Analysis

A complex network topology marked by co-competitive relationships between manufacturing enterprises can meaningfully influence low-carbon technology selection, thereby affecting the low-carbon technology diffusion process. This study develops a small-world network game model based on an optimal update strategy involving the government and manufacturers with co-competitive relationships, and then uses it to assess the evolutionary dynamics of low-carbon technology selection and diffusion among manufacturers. The results indicate that the government should identify the critical threshold for subsidies based on the carbon tax to optimize the regulatory and incentivizing effects of government subsidies. The topological structure of manufacturers’ small-world networks is the key to low-carbon technology selection and diffusion. In favorable conditions, when a small-world network approaches a regular network in terms of structure, the extent of low-carbon technology diffusion is maximized; in unfavorable conditions, diffusion is minimal. Thus, the government can tighten or relax market access restrictions on the manufacturing industry and encourage the development of manufacturing clusters to change the structure of market competition. Compared with the random selection, the optimal update strategy can increase the probability density of low-carbon technology diffusion among manufacturers and rapidly achieve a balanced, stable state.