Public Reason and the Central Human Capabilities

A core component of Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities approach is a list of ten central human capabilities that should provide a basis for an overlapping consensus regarding what a constitutional democratic state owes its citizens as a matter of justice. There is an ambiguity in Nussbaum’s justification of the central human capabilities understood as substantive moral principles, and Nussbaum’s method of justification of public reason: an overlapping consensus between the views that “reasonable” people are likely to accept, and which may not be based on any specific comprehensive doctrine. I begin by explaining the need to enhance Nussbaum’s capabilities approach to eliminate the ambiguity. I then formulate and defend the enhanced version of the capabilities approach. Finally, I formulate and respond to possible objections to the proposed account. Shifting the focus from the contents of conflicting normative accounts to their theoretical architecture can help advocates of these accounts find common ground from which to pursue an overlapping consensus.