Evaluating Lightweight and Standard Encryption Algorithms for Iot Security and Efficiency

The Internet of Things (IoT) presents unique security challenges due to its reliance on resource-constrained devices. This study evaluates the performance of standard ciphers (AES, DES, 3DES, Blowfish) and lightweight ciphers (SIMON, PRESENT, PICCOLO) under IoT-specific constraints. Simulations were conducted using practical parameters such as transport delay, noise levels, and power limits. Lightweight ciphers demonstrated stronger resistance to noise injection attacks but remained vulnerable to brute force and differential cryptanalysis attacks. SIMON emerged as the most efficient lightweight cipher, achieving <tex xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">$\mathbf{9 9. 5 3 \%}$</tex> lower latency and <tex xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">$\mathbf{9 9. 9 8 \%}$</tex> reduced energy consumption compared to AES. However, lightweight ciphers exhibited increased error rates under higher loads, highlighting the tradeoffs between scalability and security in IoT environments. Future directions include hybrid encryption approaches and adaptive cryptographic frameworks for enhanced resilience.