Pragmatism Versus Formalism: Theoretical Analysis and Reform Reflections on the Dilemmas of Modern Governance

This paper explores the persistent tension between formalism and pragmatism in modern governance, analyzing their theoretical underpinnings, real-world manifestations, and policy implications. Formalism, rooted in bureaucratic rationality and institutional legitimacy, often leads to governance inefficiencies through over-compliance, risk avoidance, and symbolic conformity. Drawing on case studies from China’s local governance and Western regulatory systems, the paper illustrates how formalism manifests in performance fabrication, digitalized formalism, and compliance overload. In contrast, pragmatism offers a problem-oriented, outcome-driven approach that emphasizes adaptability and stakeholder collaboration. Through examples from Singapore and Denmark, the study highlights pragmatic strategies that can enhance governance responsiveness. However, it also acknowledges the institutional risks of pragmatism, such as blurred accountability and short-termism. The paper concludes by proposing an integrated governance model that balances formal rules with practical effectiveness, supported by adaptive institutions, robust feedback mechanisms, and a culture of responsible experimentation.

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Publication Details

Journal
PoliEcoM Administration Review
Published
2025-09-05
DOI
https://doi.org/10.63802/pemr.v1.i1.100
Primary Topic
Public Policy and Administration Research
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00
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article

Pragmatism Versus Formalism: Theoretical Analysis and Reform Reflections on the Dilemmas of Modern Governance

Junyu Zhu, Yang Meng, Song Chuan
PoliEcoM Administration Review
Public Policy and Administration Research
article

Pragmatism Versus Formalism: Theoretical Analysis and Reform Reflections on the Dilemmas of Modern Governance

Junyu Zhu, Yang Meng, Song Chuan
article en

Abstract

This paper explores the persistent tension between formalism and pragmatism in modern governance, analyzing their theoretical underpinnings, real-world manifestations, and policy implications. Formalism, rooted in bureaucratic rationality and institutional legitimacy, often leads to governance inefficiencies through over-compliance, risk avoidance, and symbolic conformity. Drawing on case studies from China’s local governance and Western regulatory systems, the paper illustrates how formalism manifests in performance fabrication, digitalized formalism, and compliance overload. In contrast, pragmatism offers a problem-oriented, outcome-driven approach that emphasizes adaptability and stakeholder collaboration. Through examples from Singapore and Denmark, the study highlights pragmatic strategies that can enhance governance responsiveness. However, it also acknowledges the institutional risks of pragmatism, such as blurred accountability and short-termism. The paper concludes by proposing an integrated governance model that balances formal rules with practical effectiveness, supported by adaptive institutions, robust feedback mechanisms, and a culture of responsible experimentation.

PoliEcoM Administration ReviewVol. 1(1)
Kookmin University (KR), Chongqing University (CN)
Openalex Percentile: Top 70%
Public Policy and Administration Research
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Pragmatism Versus Formalism: Theoretical Analysis and Reform Reflections on the Dilemmas of Modern Governance — Junyu Zhu, Yang Meng, et al. · PoliEcoM Administration Review (2025) | TGRS Research Map | TGRS