Legal nature of claim for transfer of ownership registration for recovering a Genuine Name

Current academic theory and case law recognize both cancellation registration and restoration registration for registrations of causal invalidity that do not conform to the substantive relationship. The majority opinion and case law maintain that both are substantive law rights claims under Article 214 of the Civil Act, and thus, the subject matter of litigation is identical, thus exerting res judicata. Furthermore, this is a claim for exclusion of interference based on ownership, and ownership arises retroactively. However, if a third party is involved in the registration to be cancelled and lacks the obligation to consent, enforcement of the cancellation registration is impossible. However, restoration registration for causal invalidity is possible by assuming the burden of the third party. However, the question of whether this constitutes a synonymous right has arisen, leading to this study. Furthermore, registration involves administrative dispositions by the registration office, and invalidity under administrative law differs significantly from invalidity under civil law, making it questionable to simply refer to it as a registration of causal invalidity. These questions led me to research the history and nature of causal registration. The author's findings are summarized below. ① If there is intent involved in the registration application, the registration disposition, as an administrative act known as notarization, should not be deemed invalid. ② Given the prerequisite principle of establishment, as stipulated in Article 186 of the Civil Act, in real rights transfers, it is desirable to adopt the principle of non-injury in the recovery of real rights due to defects in the registration act, and to unify it into a claim for the restoration of ownership based on the return of the original object. Even if the principle of inducement is adopted, ③ it is reasonable to view the restoration of ownership as occurring after the final judgment, consistent with the temporal scope of res judicata. ④ It is reasonable to view the cancellation registration as a right based on Article 214, and the restoration registration of the true title as a right based on Article 213. ⑤ However, since real rights claims commonly involve the nature of return, they should all be considered to have the same nature as claims for the return of the original object under Article 747.