Working From Home and Performance Pay: Individual or Collective Payment Schemes?

ABSTRACT Working from home (WFH) reduces real‐time visibility of employees within the physical space of the workplace. This makes it difficult to monitor employees’ work behaviour. Employers may instead monitor employees’ outputs and provide incentives through performance pay. The crucial question is what type of performance pay employers provide to incentivize employees who work from home. Using British panel data, we find that WFH decreases the likelihood of solely receiving individual performance pay. It increases the likelihood of receiving collective performance pay—with or without individual performance pay. This pattern also holds in instrumental variable estimations accounting for endogeneity. Our findings fit theoretical considerations. WFH means that employees have less opportunities to socialize at work entailing the tendency that they focus on personal achievement and neglect collaboration. Solely rewarding individual performance may reinforce this tendency. By contrast, employers reward collective performance as it counteracts the adverse effects of WFH by providing incentives for collaboration, helping on the job and information sharing.

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Publication Details

Journal
British Journal of Industrial Relations
Published
2025-09-04
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1111/bjir.70012
Primary Topic
Employment and Welfare Studies
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00

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article

Working From Home and Performance Pay: Individual or Collective Payment Schemes?

Cinzia Rienzo, Uwe Jirjahn
British Journal of Industrial Relations
Employment and Welfare Studies
article

Working From Home and Performance Pay: Individual or Collective Payment Schemes?

Cinzia Rienzo, Uwe Jirjahn
article en

Abstract

ABSTRACT Working from home (WFH) reduces real‐time visibility of employees within the physical space of the workplace. This makes it difficult to monitor employees’ work behaviour. Employers may instead monitor employees’ outputs and provide incentives through performance pay. The crucial question is what type of performance pay employers provide to incentivize employees who work from home. Using British panel data, we find that WFH decreases the likelihood of solely receiving individual performance pay. It increases the likelihood of receiving collective performance pay—with or without individual performance pay. This pattern also holds in instrumental variable estimations accounting for endogeneity. Our findings fit theoretical considerations. WFH means that employees have less opportunities to socialize at work entailing the tendency that they focus on personal achievement and neglect collaboration. Solely rewarding individual performance may reinforce this tendency. By contrast, employers reward collective performance as it counteracts the adverse effects of WFH by providing incentives for collaboration, helping on the job and information sharing.

British Journal of Industrial RelationsVol. 64(1)
Trier University of Applied Sciences (DE), University of Brighton (GB), Universität Trier (DE)
University of Essex, Understanding Society, Economic and Social Research Council
Openalex Percentile: Top 63%
Employment and Welfare Studies
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