Rather more on <scp>AI</scp> from the point of view of ordinary language philosophy

Abstract In a recent paper in this journal, ‘AI from the point of view of ordinary language’ (Kemp, G. (2025). ‘AI from the point of view of ordinary language’, Philosophical Investigations : 48(3): 290–298), Gary Kemp presents himself with a large and challenging task, where the dangers of going wildly wrong are not to be underestimated. His approach is modest, perhaps in tacit acknowledgement of these dangers. He describes the paper tentatively as an exercise in ‘Ordinary Language Philosophy’. I raise questions about the substance and style of his approach and go on to discuss Laith Abdel‐Rahman's ‘The Forms of Artificially Intelligent Life: Brandom, Chomsky and Wittgenstein on the Possibility of Strong‐AI’. This provides a contrast in style with Kemp's paper and does not directly address questions of ordinary language philosophy. My argument is that Kemp offers too constrained an account of the bearing of ordinary language (philosophy) on AI, while Abdel‐Rahman, although attentive to the possibilities of different life forms, seems partly to misconceive the nature of human connectedness. I provide a sketch of ways in which a fuller coverage of these matters might lead towards a better understanding of AI's development in our world.