Multiple Large Shareholders and Corporate R&D Manipulation: An Agency Cost Perspective

ABSTRACT R&D manipulation by enterprises has become an important issue affecting the quality of innovation and market equity. From a shareholding structure perspective, this paper tries to test the association between multiple large shareholders and R&D manipulation. Employing Chinese listed firms' data from 2009 to 2023, we find that multiple large shareholders promote corporate R&D manipulation behaviour by exacerbating agency problems. In addition, media attention and analyst attention can play a governance role and help weaken the multiple large shareholders' promoting effect on R&D manipulation behaviour. This paper delves into the impact of collusive motives on R&D manipulation in the context of multiple large shareholders coexistence. Drawing on agency cost theory, this paper constructs a theoretical model in which multiple large shareholders raise agency costs, ultimately leading to elevated corporate R&D manipulation. In the practical sense, this paper provides a path reference for enterprises to establish a collaborative monitoring mechanism for large shareholders, which is an important managerial inspiration for curbing R&D manipulation and ultimately realising sustainable development.