Experimental Evaluation of a Novel Hardware-Based Authentication Solution for Securing Electrical Grids

Increase in digital connectivity and integration of distributed energy resources (DERs) into the electrical grid is expanding the attack surface for cyber threats, particularly within the supply chain of industrial control systems (ICS). Supply-chain attacks, such as SolarWinds and NotPetya, exploit trusted third parties to inject malicious software into critical infrastructure. To address these vulnerabilities, the Georgia Institute of Technology has developed GridTrust, a cybersecurity technology that leverages physically unclonable functions (PUFs) as a root-of-trust (RoT) to enable secure authentication of, and to prevent unauthorized access to, industrial control devices. This paper details the methodology for evaluating GridTrust's effectiveness through controlled laboratory experiments and realworld field testing in collaboration with a power utility operator. The testing framework includes assessments of software update security, operational command authentication, and resilience against adversarial threats, in both a power substation environment and a pole-mounted utility cabinet. This work provides insights into testing and evaluation of cybersecurity technologies for the electrical grid