Bringing Independent Cybersecurity Assessments to Space Systems
This paper presents a practical experience report on top of the application of Independent Software Verification and Validation (ISVV) in the space domain, specifically on the Galileo Second Generation satellites, and proposes a methodology for security analysis that can be transferred to the Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) domain. We explore the application of security assessments, similar to ISVV processes. The proposed methodology for security analysis and validation includes security checklists, source code security analysis and various security validation techniques. We expect significant cybersecurity improvements, a contribution to the specification of secure design and security requirements (system and software), and the implementation of comprehensive testing campaigns covering the known space systems threats and vulnerabilities, including mutation and sensitivity analysis, to reduce security threats and risks. Future work involves applying these methods to a UAV case study, collecting relevant metrics, and providing feedback to international standards to further enhance security and safety in these critical domains.
Authors
- João Gaspar (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2758-2667)
- Mauro Gameiro
- Nuno Silva (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8653-1499)
- Gustavo Dinis
Institutions
- Critical Software (Portugal) (PT)
Publication Details
- Published
- 2025-04-08
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1109/edcc-c66476.2025.00061
- Primary Topic
- Space Satellite Systems and Control
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00