De-recognition of seceding territories: What precedes it in constitutional discourse and what follows in international politics

Abstract The de-recognition of states and the related practice of the parent state’s de-recognition campaign after unilateral secession, highly undertheorized topics in all relevant disciplines, have been particularly ignored in constitutional law. Since the first topic does not involve constitutional controversy, the apathy of constitutional scholarship is logical. Still, the silence in constitutional law about the parent state’s de-recognition campaign, a type of counter-secession tool, is not because secession is a topic frequently debated in constitutional law. After briefly touring the de-recognition of state cases and summarizing definitional and differentiation issues, this article fills the gap in constitutional theory by explaining (i) how the parent state’s de-recognition campaign fits within the framework of government, (ii) why an essential causal link exists between the parent state’s de-recognition campaign and the constitutional concepts of ‘demarcation’ sovereignty and territorial integrity, (iii) why territorial rights, the concept borrowed from political philosophy, offer no defense to the parent state’s strategy aimed at reducing the number of states that have recognized a contested state, and (iv) why waging the de-recognition campaign has a remedial effect in constitutional and international law despite potential challenges that might arise from geopolitical interests or populist abuse.[It] is said that in laying down the laws the legislator must have his attention fixed on two things, the territory and the population … for if a constitution is to be preserved, all the sections of the state must wish it to exist and to continue on the same.Aristotle, Politics1