Case Analysis of 3 Billion Fake Financial Management Internal Control Failure of Minsheng Bank

This paper analyzes Minsheng Bank's 2017 case of 3-billion-yuan fake wealth management products, discussing the causes of internal control failures and summarizing its implications for commercial banks' internal control in China. It reviews internal control theories, conducts a panoramic analysis of the case, constructs an evolutionary game model to explore the strategic choices of the head office and branches, and proposes targeted countermeasures. The study finds that the strategic choices of the head office and branches change dynamically, with branches' decisions influenced by strict internal control and penalties from the head office. Increasing branch business sharing and punishment are effective ways to improve internal control. The innovation lies in using this case to analyze internal control failures, incorporating bounded rationality into the evolutionary game model, and examining long-term strategic evolution.

Publication Details

Journal
Academic Journal of Business & Management
Published
2025-01-01
DOI
https://doi.org/10.25236/ajbm.2025.070711
Primary Topic
Insurance and Financial Risk Management
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00
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article

Case Analysis of 3 Billion Fake Financial Management Internal Control Failure of Minsheng Bank

Academic Journal of Business & Management
Insurance and Financial Risk Management
article

Case Analysis of 3 Billion Fake Financial Management Internal Control Failure of Minsheng Bank

article en

Abstract

This paper analyzes Minsheng Bank's 2017 case of 3-billion-yuan fake wealth management products, discussing the causes of internal control failures and summarizing its implications for commercial banks' internal control in China. It reviews internal control theories, conducts a panoramic analysis of the case, constructs an evolutionary game model to explore the strategic choices of the head office and branches, and proposes targeted countermeasures. The study finds that the strategic choices of the head office and branches change dynamically, with branches' decisions influenced by strict internal control and penalties from the head office. Increasing branch business sharing and punishment are effective ways to improve internal control. The innovation lies in using this case to analyze internal control failures, incorporating bounded rationality into the evolutionary game model, and examining long-term strategic evolution.

Academic Journal of Business & ManagementVol. 7(7)
Openalex Percentile: Top 68%
Insurance and Financial Risk Management
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