ADMM-Based Adversarial False Data Injection Attacks Against Multi-Label Locational Detection

While multi-label learning has shown excellent performance in False Data Injection Attack (FDIA) locational detection, it has also exposed some potential security risks and vulnerabilities. However, unlike the image domain, the vulnerabilities of multi-label learning in the field of power grid have just received attention and urgently need to be explored and addressed. In this paper, to achieve a better understanding for the security risks of deep learning-based multi-label FDIA detectors, we propose two Alternating Direction Method of Multipliers (ADMM) based adversarial attacks, which are applicable to two different scenarios. The proposed two ADMM-based attacks aim to reduce additional attack costs while seeking suitable adversarial perturbations, making the attacks more realistic and feasible. The experimental results verify the effectiveness of the proposed ADMM-based attacks, making noteworthy strides in fostering a profound comprehension of the vulnerabilities in the unique field of deep multi-label learning for power systems.

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Publication Details

Journal
IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
Published
2025-09-02
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1109/tdsc.2025.3605689
Citations
8
Primary Topic
Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
19.85
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article

ADMM-Based Adversarial False Data Injection Attacks Against Multi-Label Locational Detection

Xiaofang Xia, Peican Zhu, Chenhao Lin, Chao Ren et al.
8 citations
IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning
19.85
article

ADMM-Based Adversarial False Data Injection Attacks Against Multi-Label Locational Detection

Xiaofang Xia, Peican Zhu, Chenhao Lin, Chao Ren, Jiwei Tian, Xiang Chen, Meng Zhang, Chunming Wu, Chao Shen
article en
8 citations

Abstract

While multi-label learning has shown excellent performance in False Data Injection Attack (FDIA) locational detection, it has also exposed some potential security risks and vulnerabilities. However, unlike the image domain, the vulnerabilities of multi-label learning in the field of power grid have just received attention and urgently need to be explored and addressed. In this paper, to achieve a better understanding for the security risks of deep learning-based multi-label FDIA detectors, we propose two Alternating Direction Method of Multipliers (ADMM) based adversarial attacks, which are applicable to two different scenarios. The proposed two ADMM-based attacks aim to reduce additional attack costs while seeking suitable adversarial perturbations, making the attacks more realistic and feasible. The experimental results verify the effectiveness of the proposed ADMM-based attacks, making noteworthy strides in fostering a profound comprehension of the vulnerabilities in the unique field of deep multi-label learning for power systems.

IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure ComputingVol. 23(1)
Xidian University (CN), Zhejiang University of Science and Technology (CN), Northwestern Polytechnical University (CN), Nanyang Technological University (SG), Air Force Engineering University (CN), Xi'an Jiaotong University (CN)
Openalex Percentile: Top 1%
Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning
19.85
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ADMM-Based Adversarial False Data Injection Attacks Against Multi-Label Locational Detection — Xiaofang Xia, Peican Zhu, et al. · IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing (2025) | TGRS Research Map | TGRS