Characterising Ecosystem Power: the Use of Pricing and Contractual Leverages

This paper presents a conceptualisation and characterisation of ecosystem power, distinguishing it from market power and bargaining power. Unlike market power, which primarily concerns external relationships of a firm, and bargaining power, which addresses bilateral relationships, ecosystem power operates through multi-sided relationships, shaping pricing and contractual structures and determining welfare distribution among stakeholders within ecosystems. By identifying pricing and contractual leverages as key mechanisms for the exercise of ecosystem power, the paper demonstrates how platforms exploit economically dependent user groups while favouring others, often consumers, without necessarily enhancing overall welfare. The paper also provides an overview of the legal assessment of the use of pricing and contractual leverages under EU competition law, as well as its intersection with contract law and consumer law. Competition law, traditionally focused on external market relations, lacks tools to regulate internal welfare distribution, while consumer and contract law fail to adequately protect economically dependent users, especially small businesses and gig workers within ecosystems. To address these gaps, the paper proposes the concept of distributive equity as a further consideration for antitrust enforcement to ensure an equitable welfare distribution across ecosystem participants.

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Publication Details

Journal
Utrecht Law Review
Published
2025-01-01
DOI
https://doi.org/10.36633/ulr.1097
Primary Topic
Economic and Environmental Valuation
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00
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article

Characterising Ecosystem Power: the Use of Pricing and Contractual Leverages

M. Li
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Utrecht Law Review
Economic and Environmental Valuation
article

Characterising Ecosystem Power: the Use of Pricing and Contractual Leverages

M. Li
article en

Abstract

This paper presents a conceptualisation and characterisation of ecosystem power, distinguishing it from market power and bargaining power. Unlike market power, which primarily concerns external relationships of a firm, and bargaining power, which addresses bilateral relationships, ecosystem power operates through multi-sided relationships, shaping pricing and contractual structures and determining welfare distribution among stakeholders within ecosystems. By identifying pricing and contractual leverages as key mechanisms for the exercise of ecosystem power, the paper demonstrates how platforms exploit economically dependent user groups while favouring others, often consumers, without necessarily enhancing overall welfare. The paper also provides an overview of the legal assessment of the use of pricing and contractual leverages under EU competition law, as well as its intersection with contract law and consumer law. Competition law, traditionally focused on external market relations, lacks tools to regulate internal welfare distribution, while consumer and contract law fail to adequately protect economically dependent users, especially small businesses and gig workers within ecosystems. To address these gaps, the paper proposes the concept of distributive equity as a further consideration for antitrust enforcement to ensure an equitable welfare distribution across ecosystem participants.

Utrecht Law ReviewVol. 21(1)
Openalex Percentile: Top 69%
Economic and Environmental Valuation
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Characterising Ecosystem Power: the Use of Pricing and Contractual Leverages — M. Li · Utrecht Law Review (2025) | TGRS Research Map | TGRS