Comment on: Rokosz et al. (2025). Yes, many heads really are more utilitarian than one

Rokosz et al. (2025) apply the CNI model of Gawronski et al. (2017) to analyze the apparent result that groups are more utilitarian than individuals in answering sacrificial moral dilemmas involving trade-offs of harm to a few against harm to many. They conclude that the difference is largely due to a change in attention to consequences, and no substantial effect on attention to deontological moral norms that (for example) prohibit harming a person even if many others would benefit. We show that their results can be explained by a second effect of groups. They reduce responses that appear nonsensical, e.g., when subjects in the group choose action even though both norms and consequences favor omission. When this effect is accounted for, the CNI model yields the conclusion that groups have both effects, increasing attention to consequences and reducing attention to deontological norms. Thus group discussion, after all, may well reduce the pull of deontological norms, which are the main impediment to utilitarian judgments.

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Publication Details

Journal
Cognition
Published
2025-09-01
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2025.106296
Primary Topic
Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00
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article

Comment on: Rokosz et al. (2025). Yes, many heads really are more utilitarian than one

Niels Skovgaard‐Olsen, Jonathan Baron
Cognition
Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
article

Comment on: Rokosz et al. (2025). Yes, many heads really are more utilitarian than one

Niels Skovgaard‐Olsen, Jonathan Baron
article en

Abstract

Rokosz et al. (2025) apply the CNI model of Gawronski et al. (2017) to analyze the apparent result that groups are more utilitarian than individuals in answering sacrificial moral dilemmas involving trade-offs of harm to a few against harm to many. They conclude that the difference is largely due to a change in attention to consequences, and no substantial effect on attention to deontological moral norms that (for example) prohibit harming a person even if many others would benefit. We show that their results can be explained by a second effect of groups. They reduce responses that appear nonsensical, e.g., when subjects in the group choose action even though both norms and consequences favor omission. When this effect is accounted for, the CNI model yields the conclusion that groups have both effects, increasing attention to consequences and reducing attention to deontological norms. Thus group discussion, after all, may well reduce the pull of deontological norms, which are the main impediment to utilitarian judgments.

CognitionVol. 271
University of Freiburg (DE), University of Pennsylvania (US)
Openalex Percentile: Top 77%
Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
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